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Abstract 
 The subject of insurance law has been a very trickish and clumsy one to anybody who 
desires to know about it or conduct any research with regard to same. The general notion of 
the public against insurance companies is very negative when it comes to the aspect of 
payment of indemnity by the insurers. Perhaps based on a simple or very trivial excuse, the 
insurer may repudiate liability either on the basis of non – disclosure or non – possession of 
insurable interest e.t.c. In most cases, insurers have denied or repudiated indemnities on 
ground of non – disclosure which in all of the policies are made to be a ―warranty‖ or 
―conditions‖ which goes to the root of the contract itself. The common law rule on this is very 
strict and therefore operates against the claim of the assured whenever the defence is raised 
by the insurer. 
However, the Nigerian Insurance Act, appears to have remedied this common law position by 
making the concept of non – disclosure equitable to both parties to an insurance policy. It is 
hereby suggested that other jurisdiction should follow suit for the development of insurance 
law. 
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The doctrine of „non – disclosure‟ under the law of insurance: a critical appraisal 
Intoduction 
 A contract of insurance can be defined as a contract whereby a person called the 
insurer agrees in consideration of money paid to him, called the premium, by another person, 
called the assured, to indemnify the latter against loss resulting to him on the happening of 
certain events. 
 In the widest sense of the term, a contract of insurance can also be defined as a 
contract whereby one person, called the ―Insurer‖ undertakes, in return for the agreed 
consideration, called the ―premium‖ to pay to another person, called the ―Assured‖ a sum of 
money, or its equivalent on the happening of a specified event
90
. 
 It must be borne in mind from the outset that a contract of insurance is a contract 
uberrimae fidei
91
 i. e., contract of utmost good faith. The utmost good faith is required from 
both the assured and the insurer although, the heavier duty usually falls on the assured
92
. 
                                                          
90
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1904) 2 K. B. 658 at p. 663. per CHANNELL J. 
―Where you insure a ship or a house, you cannot insure that the ship shall not be lost or the house burned, but 
what you do insure is that a sum of money shall be paid on the happening of a certain event. That I think is the 
first requirement in a contract of insurance. It must be a contract whereby, for some consideration, usually, but 
not necessarily, for periodical payment called premiums, you secure to yourself some benefit usually but not 
necessarily the payment of a sum of money upon the happening of some event‖. 
91
 See Volume 25, Halsbury‘s Law of England. 
92
London Assurance Co. v. Mansel (1879)11 Ch. D. 363. 
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 It is a requisite of this principle that there should be no shady dealings, but transparent 
honesty. This principle of utmost good faith has become clearly established in the Law of 
insurance and thus, Lord Mansfield in 1766 said in Carter v. Boehn
93
 as follows: - 
“The assured is under duty to disclose all material facts and make no 
misrepresentation …. The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and 
all dealing …… Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
knows to draw the other into a bargain from his ignorance of that fact, and his 
believing the contrary” 
 The rule of caveat emptor is not in consonance with the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in 
the law of insurance and the reason is to prevent fraud and encourage good faith. 
 The rationale for the rule include, the everyday requirement for honesty, the peculiarly 
aleatory
94
 nature of a contract of insurance, which calls for perfect comprehension of the risk 
undertaken, and commercial usage as developed in this area over the ages. Thus, it may be 
said that in the contract of insurance the greatest premium is placed on the basis that one must 
love his neighbour as himself. 
 In America, the attitude has been to distinguish between the Marine and non-Marine 
Insurance contracts and to apply the rule of utmost good faith less stringently in the latter
95
. 
 On the other hands, in many African Countires the Courts have to follow the common 
law
96
. 
 In view of the fact that the harshness of the rule is sometimes recognized, nonetheless, 
not much has been done to alleviate the burdens of the assured especially where illiterates 
have been involved
97
. Thus, the law does not consider the parties interest in the subject-matter 
of the contract for its validity. 
 However, in contract of insurance, this requirement must have to be complied with 
since the assured‘s interest in the subject-matter of insurance is important for the validity of 
the contract. Per PHILLIMORE J.  stated as follows: 
“Anybody who sues on a policy can only sue in respect of his own interest 
unless by special provisions, the law allowing it, the policy is made for the sake 
of another, or unless some statute says the policy shall enure for the benefit of 
somebody else”98. 
 
Elements of a valid contract of insurance 
 It is pertinent to mention briefly that there are some essential elements of a valid 
contract of insurance. 
 In the first instance, there must be an agreement between parties through offer and 
acceptance. Thus, per LORD ESHER, M. R. stated that: 
“At the beginning …… I was much taken with ordinary proposition that a 
proposal and an acceptance of that proposal make a contract. Whether that is 
so or not, depends on whether the one was meant to be a proposal and the 
other an acceptance by way of contract”99. 
 An element of consideration must be present in all types of policies of insurance. 
                                                          
93
 (1766) 3 Bur at 1905, (1558 -1774) All E.R. Rep. 183. 
94
Blakbun v. Vigors Brothers Ltd. (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 561. 
95
 Vance: Insurance Law 3
rd
 ed. Chap. 7. 
96
 See Akpata v. African Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., (1966) 2 A.N.L.R. p. 317; Zambian v. New India 
Assurance Co. Ltd., (1964) 1 A.L.R. (Comm.) p. 4. 
97
Northern Assurance Co. Ltd., v. Idugbee (1966) 1 A.L.R. (Comm.) p. 155. 
98Cosford Union v. Poor Law and Local Government Officers‘ Mutual Guarantee Association Ltd., (1910) 103 
L.T. 463 at 465. 
99
Canning v. Farquhar (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 727. 
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 The premium is the consideration which the insurers receive from the assured in 
exchange for their undertaking to pay the sum insured in the event insured against
100
. 
 Furthermore, capacity to enter into an insurance policy generally is the same as in 
other types of contract which is governed by the general law of contract. Thus, a minor may 
enter into a contract of insurance if it is for his benefit
101
 otherwise, the contract of insurance 
will not be binding upon him
102
. At the same time, a contract of insurance made by a person 
of unsound mind or drunken person is in certain circumstances, voidable
103
. 
 Lastly, the subject-matter of the insurance contract must be present. For example, if a 
proposed assured is insuring a motor car or motor vehicle, the law requires him i.e. (the 
assured) to possess a motor car or motor vehicle which must have to be specifically, 
described in the insurance policy. 
 In a nutshell, the decision in Esewe v. Asiemo
104
 has summarized all the essentials of 
a valid contract of insurance as follows: 
“The essentials of a contract of insurance are its objects namely, the vehicle 
insured, the amount for which it was assured, its purchase price and risk 
against which vehicle is insured”. 
 The case held further that the intention to create the contract being established the 
essentials of the contract having been offered and premium having been paid there was a 
valid contact of insurance. 
 This article takes a critical look at the concept of non - disclosure as a basic principle 
of a contract of insurance at the time of making the contract. 
 Consequently, the substantial part to this paper will be devoted to the meaning of non 
- disclosure, the rationale behind the requirement of the concept in contracts of insurance, 
instances where it is applicable, within the common law perspective and the statutory 
provisions. 
 
The nature and scope of the duty to disclose material facts 
In Lindenau v. Desborough
105
 Barley J. said: 
“I think that in all cases of insurance, whether on ships, houses, or lives, the 
underwriter should be informed of every material fact within the knowledge of 
the assured …….. But if it must be disclosed it will be the interest of the 
assured to make a full and fair disclosure of all the information within their 
reach” 
Littledale J.
106
 in the same case said: 
“It is the duty of the assured in all cases to disclose all material facts within 
their knowledge”. 
Also in Rozanes v. Bowen, Sankey L. J
107
. while concurring with Sctutton L. J. said
108
: 
“The next point is that, apart from any question of the answers in the policy, 
persons who desire in England, and I have no doubt in other countries too, to 
insure are bound to disclose material facts”. 
Earlier on, in the case, Scrutton L. J. has asserted that
109
: 
                                                          
100
Sun Insurance Office v. Clark (1912) A.C. 443. 
101
Clements v. London & North Western railway o. (1894) 2 Q.B. 482. 
102
Imperial Life Insurance Co. v. Charlebois (1902) 22 C.L.R. 417. 
103
Imperial Life Assurance of Canada V. Audett (1912) 20 W.L.R. 372. 
104
 (1974) 4 U.I.L.R. p. 355. 
105
 (1828) 8 B & C 596 E.R. 1160 
106
 Ibid at P. 1162 
107
 (1928) 3211 L. R. 98 
108
 Ibid at P. 103 
109
 Ibid at P. 102 
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“It has been for centuries in England the law in connection with insurance of 
all sorts …… the duty of the assured ………. to make a full disclosure to the 
underwriters without being asked of all material circumstances”110. 
 
Limitation in the duty of disclosure 
Knowledge 
 The duty to disclose is limited by one‘s knowledge111. ―It does not extend to what one 
does not know or what one cannot reasonably be expected to know
112
. 
 In Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company Limited, Fletcher Moulton L. J. 
said: 
“But in my opinion there is a point here which often is not sufficiently kept in 
mind. The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do not 
know. The obligation to disclose therefore, necessarily depends on the 
knowledge you possess”113. 
 Also, Lord Campbell in Wheelton v. Hardisty
114
, said that the assured is always 
bound; 
“To disclose any fact exclusively within his knowledge which is material for the 
assurer to know”. 
 In Messers Century Insurance Company Limited v. Atuanya
115
. A man insured his car 
with the plaintiff. The car was destroyed by fire. When he claimed, the company denied 
liability on the ground that the plaintiff did not disclose a refusal of his insurance by another 
company. It was found, as a matter of fact that the plaintiff was ignorant of this fact when he 
was proposing the insurance. The court, therefore, held that the defence failed, as he could not 
be expected to disclose what he did not know. 
 Also in Akpata v. African Alliance Insurance Company Ltd
116
. Taylor C. J. held that 
the important point for consideration was not the period when the deceased, (who had insured 
his life) can be said to have had the first signs of carcinoma of the stomach or the ailments 
contained in question, rather: 
“It is when deceased first had knowledge that he was so suffering or if it took 
place before he had personal knowledge, when was he first told by his 
physician that he was so suffering”. 
 In that case, it was shown by evidence, that the deceased did not know of his disease 
or ailment until after the policy was issued. 
 
Opinion and intention 
 Fletcher-Moulton, L. J. hastened to explain that the knowledge is quite different from 
opinion or intention. ―I must not be misunderstood‖, he warned, ―Your opinion of the 
materiality is of no moment‖117. But the question always is what was the knowledge you 
possessed such that you ought to have disclosed it‖? 
 He proceeded to elucidate the real nature of the duty to disclose in the following 
statements: 
                                                          
110
 See also Hartford Protection Insurance Co. v. Harmer 91853) 2 Ohio St. 452 at 472 (per Ranney J.) 
111
 See Carter v. Boehm (1776) 3 Burr 1905; 97 E. R. 1166. 
112
Messers Centuy Assurance Co. v. Atuanya (1967) 2 A;; N.L.R. 317. 
113
 (1908) L. K. B. 863. 
114
 (1857) 8 e.&b. 232, at 269 – 270. 
115
 (Per Ikpeazu, J.) (Supra) The Court showed a cleavage between Marine Insurance and Non-Marine Insurance 
in his case. 
116
 (1967) A. L. R. (Comm.) 4. 
117Joel‘s Case (supra) P. 879 et. Sep. 
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“This duty is analogous to a duty to do an act which you undertake with 
reasonable care and skill, a failure to do which amounts to negligence, which 
is not atoned for by any amount of honesty or good intention. The disclosure 
must be of all you ought to have realized to be material, not of that only which 
you did in fact realize to be so.”118 
 The above statements of the law represent the English position, that the assured 
cannot insist on what he thinks or believes to be material as the preudent insurer is the test. 
In Horne v. Poland Lush J. said: 
“It is immaterial that the plaintiff would not take the view that his countrymen 
are not as careful and trustworthy as Englishmen”119. 
  Also in Bates v. Hewitt
120
 Cockburn C. J. declared: 
“I think that we should be sanctioning an encroachment on a most important 
principle, and one that is vital in keeping up the full and perfect faith which 
there ought to be contracts of Maine Insurance, if we were to hold that a party-
who is under an obligation to communicate the material conditions and facts 
which he invites another to enter-may speculate as to what may or may not be 
brought to his mind by the particulars disclosed to him by the assured, if those 
particulars fall short of the fact which the assured is bound to communicate. If 
we were to sanction such a course … we should be lending ourselves to 
innovations of a dangerous and monstrous character”. 
 
Duration of the duty of disclosure 
 Generally the duty of disclosure starts from the period when the assured proposes to 
the insurer and continues throughout the negotiations until at least the contract has been 
completed by acceptance or the negotiation ceased. As such, any material fact which at any 
stage of the negotiation comes to the knowledge of the proposed assured must be 
communicated to the insurers. Also, statements which were accurate at one stage of the 
negotiation but has become inaccurate thereafter must be disclosed before all contract is 
concluded. On the other hand, the duty of disclosure ceases when the contract is concluded
121
. 
In Re Yager and Guardian Assurance Company
122
, Channel J. said: 
“The time up to which it must be disclosed is the time when the contract is 
concluded. Any material fact that comes to his knowledge before the contract 
he must disclose”. 
 Similarly, in Canning v. Farguhar
123
, Lord Esher M. R. said: 
“In insurance law …… the material time is the moment when the insurance is 
made and the representations ought to be true then”. 
 In Whitwell v. Autocar Fire and Acident Insurance Co. Ltd
124
., the proposer was 
asked whether any company had declined to insure him. He answered in the negative. The 
answer was in fact true. At that time, quite unknown to the proposer, however, two days 
before the proposal was accepted, another insurance company had declined to insure him. The 
court held that there was no duty to disclose this fact afterwards because the contract was 
concluded before the refusal was known to the assured. 
                                                          
118
 Ibid (underlining mine) 
119
 (1922) 2 K. B. 364 
120
 (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 595. 
121
Lishman v. Noethern Maritime Ins. Co. (1875) L. R. 10 C. P. 
122
 (1912) 108 L. T. 8. 
123
 (1886) 16 O.B.D. 727. 
124
 (1927) 27 Ll. L.R. 418. 
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 The parties are however free to extend the duration of disclosure or modify it as they 
which by the terms of the contract. This is commonly done in life policies where a clause is 
inserted, to the effect that the risk commences only after the receipt of the first premium by 
the insurer. In such a case, the proposer will be obliged to disclose any material fact which 
comes to his knowledge before the first premium is received. 
 Thus, in Looker v. law Union and Roack Insurance co. Ltd
125
., there was question as 
follows: - 
“Are you now free from disease or effects?” The proposer answered, Yes, five 
days later the insurance company sent a conditional acceptance of the risk 
stating that, “if the health of the life proposed remains meanwhile unaffected, 
the policy will be issued on payment of the first premium”. 
 Five days after the receipt of this letter, the assured became ill ad died within four 
days from pneumonia, No notice of his illness was given to the company but the assured sent 
a cheque for the first premium to the company. The cheque was however dishonoured on 
presentation. 
 The court held that the company was not bound to issues a policy. According to Acton 
J.: ―There was a failure to discharge a duty incumbent upon all proposers of contracts of 
insurance …………….. namely, a duty to inform the insurers of any material change in the 
nature of the risk to be undertaken by them……‖. 
 In Re Yager and Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd
126
. A fire policy contained a condition 
that ―No insurance is in force until the premium is paid‖. 
 On 27
th
 September, 1910, the claimant became aware that L. C. Company had refused 
to continue his policy beyond 1910, but he did not communicate this to the Guardian 
Assurance Co. Ltd on 28
th
 September, the Guardian executed a policy in his favour from 1910 
– 1911. A fire occurred and this claim was brought. The claim was resisted by the Guardian 
for a failure to disclose a material fact. 
 The court held that the fact that L. Company had refused to continue the policy was a 
material fact, that when this fact became known to the claimant on the 27
th
 September there 
was no concluded contract and that it was still the duty of the claimant to disclose such fact to 
the Guardian. 
 Lord Alverstone said: 
“In my opinion it cannot be said that this document of the 21st September was a 
contract. There was in the first place, on the face of the document to be no 
contract until the premium was paid”. 
 Similarly, in Harrington v. Pearl Life Assurance Co. Ltd
127
., a man applied for a life 
insurance in May 1912 and his proposal was accepted. The insurer‘s doctor declared him 
medically fit on examination. This policy was not effected since no premium was paid. 
 In October, 1912, he made the proposal again stating that there was no material 
change in his health. He became ill on 6
th
 November and died when the premium was 
received on 8
th
 November. It was held that there was a duty on the assured to disclose the 
change in his health before he paid the premium. 
 The parties may even further provide that the risk will not commence until the policy 
is issued and delivered to the assured. Thus, in Allis Chalmers v. Maryland Fidelity and 
Deposit Company
128
, it was provided that the insurance came into effect from the issuance of 
the policy. The policy, was executed by the insurer on 8
th
 March, but was delivered on 18
th
 
April, on 13
th
 April, the insured employee left the office and the employer suspected that he 
                                                          
125
 (1928) L. K. B. 554. 
126
 (1912) 108 L. T. 38. 
127
 (1927) 43 T. L. R. 331. 
128
 (1916) 114 L. T. 433. 
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had absconded. On 18
th
 April, the insured‘s manager was informed whereby he paid the 
premium on that day and obtained a policy. 
 When the employer claimed, it was held that the non-disclosure of the employee‘s 
abscondment vitiated the claim since there was no binding contract when the employee 
absconded. 
 Earl Loreburn concluded as follows:
129
 
“I therefore come to the conclusion that there was no completed agreement 
………. At any rate before April 18th and that prior to April 18th either party 
could have refused to proceed with this business of the insurance. When the 
policy was delivered and the premium was paid on April 18
th
, there was 
knowledge of a state of facts upon the part of the assured which admittedly 
ought to have been communicated to them and it is agreed that it is impossible 
to recover under the policy”. 
 When the policy is retrospective, there is a duty to disclose such facts which were 
material at the date from which the policy take effect and also all facts becoming material 
down to the actual date on which the contract is made. However, where the assured 
subsequently seeks to procure an alteration in terms of the contract for his own benefits, his 
duty to make disclosure will re-arise to the extent to which any material fact he then knows in 
relation to the alteration. Similarly, where the insurance is renewable or made periodically, 
the assured must disclosed all material facts which have come to his knowledge since the first 
contract
130
. 
 
Consequences of non disclosure 
 A failure to disclose any material fact, would render the contract voidable
131
. The 
aggrieved party may notify the other party that he wishes to avoid the contract upon 
discovering the non-disclosure
132
. Thereupon that party would be discharged from his 
obligations under the contract. The contract is however valid until thus avoided
133
. 
 Since the duty to disclose is not an implied term in the contract there is no cause of 
action for damages upon a breach of this duty
134
. The court may however award costs where 
appropriate, especially in cases of fraudulent non-disclosure
135
. 
 Generally, the premiums which the assured has paid are hardly recoverable, in some 
rare circumstances however, premiums may be recovered. Such circumstances exist where 
there is no fraud on the part of the assured. 
 In American International Insurance Co. Ltd v. Dike
136
, the assured was allowed to 
recover his premium since he was not fraudulent. The court held that where there no fraud 
and an insurer elects to avoid or repudiate a policy, such avoidance will have a retrospective 
effect of nullifying the contract abinitio. In that circumstance, therefore, the parties should be 
put aback as far as possible into their original position as if the contract of insurance was 
never made. 
 It is however open to the aggrieved party to waive his right and affirm the policy all 
the same
137
. To amount to waiver there must be a clear action on the part of such a party 
                                                          
129
 Ibid at P. 434. 
130
Boag v. Standard Marine Ins. Co. (1937) 2 K. B. 113 (that increase in value must be disclosed). 
131
 See. Lambert v. Cooperative Insurance Society Limited, (1975) 2 Ll. L. R. 485. 
132
March Cabaret Club abd Casino Ltd v. London Assurance (Supra). 
133
Armstrong v. Turquand  (1885) 91 I. C. L. 32. 
134
 See. Wickens, Life Assurance law in Australia, 4
th
 ed. 
135
Guardian Assurance v. Osei (1966) 2 A. L. R. (Comm.) 441. 
136
 (1967) C. C. H. C. J…………… 
137
 see also per Udo Udoma, C. J. in Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd v. Sematengo (1965) A. L. R. (Comm.) 88. 
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showing that he would not repudiate the contract. When there is a waiver the contract would 
bind both parties. 
 
Criticisms 
 It is interesting to say that the general application of the concept of non – disclosure 
known to the common law and its strict technical interpretation may in some cases operate 
unfairly to the interest of the assured in an insurance policy, but it appears that the provision 
of section 59 (1) (2) (3) (4) and (5) of the Insurance Act, Cap. 117 Law of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2004, has provided a sufficient remedy to checkmate the flagrant abuse of this 
principle by the insurers to repudiate liabilities. The relevant provision state thus: 
“(1)In a contract of insurance, a breach of a team, whether called a warranty 
or a condition, shall not give rise to any right by or afford a defence to the 
insurer against the insured unless the term is material and relevant to the risk 
or loss insured against. 
(2)Notwithstanding any provision in any written law or enactment to the 
contrary, where there is a breach of a term of contract of insurance, the insurer 
shall not be entitled to repudiate the whole or any part of the contract or a 
claim brought on the grounds of the breach unless: - 
(a)the breach amounts to a fraud; or 
(b)it is a breach of a fundamental term (whether or not it is called a warranty) 
of the contract. 
(3)Where there is a breach of a material term of a contract of insurance and 
the insured makes a claim against the insurer and the insurer is not entitled to 
repudiate the whole or any part of the contract, the insurer shall be liable to 
indemnify the insured only to the extent of the loss which would have been 
suffered if there was no breach of the term. 
(4)Nothing in this section shall prevent the insurer from repudiating a contract 
of insurance on the ground of a breach of a material term before the 
occurrence of the risk or loss insured against. 
(5) In subsection (2)(b) of this section, “fundamental term” means a 
warranty, condition or other term of an insurance contract which a prudent 
insurer will regards as material and relevant in accepting to underwrite a risk 
and in fixing the amount of premium”. 
 
Conclusion 
 The rationale of this doctrine is borne out of the fact that the nature of insurance 
contract warrants some degree of good faith and honesty in order to enable the insurers have 
the full grasp of the subject of insurance, its attendant risk and the assessments of the 
appropriate premiums. However, the strictness of the common law rules in this area of the 
insurance law has left much to be desired as it may be used as an engine of fraud by the 
insurer. This is why the Nigerian Insurance Act differs from the common law position which 
is a welcome development by legislating on this concept with a view to doing what is just and 
equitable to both parties in an insurance policy.  
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